On Wednesday May 21st Russia and China agreed to a 30-year natural gas deal worth $400 Billion. This agreement serves as a clear indication that Moscow recognizes Russia’s need to diversify its client base. Though all of the terms of the deal are unclear it would appear that the Chinese were able to get the pricing that they wanted (a factor which had delayed this deal for a decade). Moscow would not have agreed to China’s price if it were not in Russia’s interest. In the past this price was not beneficial for Russia but recently a variety of factors such as Iranian-American détente, the situation in Ukraine, and the reality that Russia will be facing demographic challenges in the coming years has changed the equation. The deal will allow Russia to demonstrate that it has options other than European market as well as affording Moscow the opportunity to focus its attention on other areas where its interests are threatened. The Caspian is once such place.
On September 29th the Caspian 5 (Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Iran) will meet in the Russian city of Astrakhan to discuss the management of the Caspian Sea. This summit could serve as a starting point for Russia to ensure that Russian companies have a stake in any potential agreement which would see oil and natural gas pipelines running through Iranian or Turkish territory. Such a move would give Russia a degree of control over energy resources that bypass Russian territory and would presumably be lucrative. In the past it was in Russia’s interest to hinder the development of transit routes which did not pass through Russian territory. Now Moscow’s ability to interfere could be weakened especially if Turkey, Iran, Azerbaijan and Georgia cooperate. If the infrastructure is going to be built and Russia is less dependent on European markets Moscow could have a financial interest in aiding the exploitation of energy resources rather than hindering projects. It is also possible that Russia could have a degree of control over the operations of key infrastructure. Pipelines that bypass Russian territory are by no means an ideal development for Russia but if this outcome is inevitable Moscow will ensure that the situation evolves in the manner that is most beneficial to Russian interests. The fact that Russia is a significant regional player means that it has leverage. Even in a weakened state Moscow can project power. For example, in 1993 Russia demanded that Lukoil be awarded a 10% stake in a consortium to develop Azerbaijan’s offshore oil fields. Baku consented. Given that China will have a 19% stake in Rosneft means that Beijing might also become a player in the region as well if Rosneft is involved in any deals (a likely scenario). This would add an additional dimension to the geopolitical situation in the Caspian.
Wednesday’s deal allows Russia to demonstrate that in the coming years it will have alternatives to the European market. The reality is that Europe has an interest in diversifying its energy supplies while Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey appear to be coming to some sort of agreement which could potentially see the development of transit corridors which link Caspian energy resources to the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The United States also has a variety of interests in undermining Russia’s energy exports. Essentially, this shift is inevitable. Moscow clearly understands this and is now making the best arrangements that it can. The terms of the China-Russia gas deal seem to favor Beijing. That said, Moscow is powerful enough to presumably force agreements in the Caspian that will favor Russia. September’s summit will provide insight into how this story will progress.
Friday, May 23, 2014
Friday, May 9, 2014
The Impact of the Ukrainian Conflict on Russia’s Arctic Ambitions
When territory becomes more valuable competition over the land in question becomes more intense. For example, we are currently seeing such a drama unfold in the South and East China Seas due to the regions’ valuable energy resources, the importance of the territories’ shipping lanes, and the pressure that unfavorable demographic trajectories are placing on regional players. In the coming decades we will likely see a similar dynamic unfold in the Arctic, however, the hemorrhaging of capital from Russia due to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and the need to maintain an active military presence near Ukraine are diverting resources away from other areas of Russian concern. This reality could complicate the country’s Arctic ambitions.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration speculates that the Arctic could hold approximately 22% of the planet’s undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas resources. The region also has significant deposits of nickel, copper, coal, gold, uranium, tungsten, iron and diamonds. Historically, the cost of exploiting these resources has been prohibitively expensive. However, the combination of technological advances, such as improved offshore production systems, three-dimensional seismic surveys, and improved drilling and completion techniques combined with retreating ice sheets are changing this dynamic. The Arctic also has shipping lanes that will see much more use as the planet continues to warm. The Northern Passage, which runs along Russia’s northern coast linking Europe with East Asia, is a transport corridor that is approximately 20% shorter than routes that transverse the Suez Canal. Some estimates predict that by 2030 25% of shipments from Europe to East Asia will use this passage. Though weather, the lack of search and rescue infrastructure, and high insurance costs currently limit the utility of this route at the present it is reasonable to believe that the Northern Passage will see more usage as the planet warms.
Events in Ukraine are distracting Russia at a time when Moscow should be aggressively staking its claims to the Arctic. Resolving the inevitable territorial disputes that will emerge as Arctic shipping lanes become more important and the exploitation of natural resources in the region increase will be a strategic imperative for Russia. It is in Moscow’s interest to aggressively pursues such policies now while the country’s demographic, military and economic strength are stronger than they might be in coming decades. Suffice it to say, the situation in Ukraine is reducing Russia’s ability to protect its long-term interests. Though maintaining Ukraine as a buffer state is a necessity for Russia it is in Moscow’s interest to try and resolve this conflict as quickly as possibly so that the country does not neglect its long term interests in other regions.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration speculates that the Arctic could hold approximately 22% of the planet’s undiscovered conventional oil and natural gas resources. The region also has significant deposits of nickel, copper, coal, gold, uranium, tungsten, iron and diamonds. Historically, the cost of exploiting these resources has been prohibitively expensive. However, the combination of technological advances, such as improved offshore production systems, three-dimensional seismic surveys, and improved drilling and completion techniques combined with retreating ice sheets are changing this dynamic. The Arctic also has shipping lanes that will see much more use as the planet continues to warm. The Northern Passage, which runs along Russia’s northern coast linking Europe with East Asia, is a transport corridor that is approximately 20% shorter than routes that transverse the Suez Canal. Some estimates predict that by 2030 25% of shipments from Europe to East Asia will use this passage. Though weather, the lack of search and rescue infrastructure, and high insurance costs currently limit the utility of this route at the present it is reasonable to believe that the Northern Passage will see more usage as the planet warms.
Events in Ukraine are distracting Russia at a time when Moscow should be aggressively staking its claims to the Arctic. Resolving the inevitable territorial disputes that will emerge as Arctic shipping lanes become more important and the exploitation of natural resources in the region increase will be a strategic imperative for Russia. It is in Moscow’s interest to aggressively pursues such policies now while the country’s demographic, military and economic strength are stronger than they might be in coming decades. Suffice it to say, the situation in Ukraine is reducing Russia’s ability to protect its long-term interests. Though maintaining Ukraine as a buffer state is a necessity for Russia it is in Moscow’s interest to try and resolve this conflict as quickly as possibly so that the country does not neglect its long term interests in other regions.
Friday, May 2, 2014
Why Russia Will Ultimately Compensate Ukraine for Crimea
Currently, Moscow is facing sanctions from the West (toothless though they may be), there is a significant military build up on the Ukrainian border and, according to the IMF, Russia is in a recession with more capital expected to flee the country. For these reasons the idea that Russia would pay Ukraine for Crimea is not a widely held belief. However, in the long term there are several factors that make it likely that Moscow will ultimately offer some form of payment to Kiev.
Despite current geopolitical and economic obstacles Russia is relatively strong, however, the country is facing significant demographic challenges. Per the World Bank, 1988 was the last time the Total Fertility Rate was 2.1 (the replacement rate). From 1991 to 2011 this metric has fluctuated between 1.2 and 1.6 while the dependency ratio is 40 and growing. This means that Russia will likely be weakened both economically and militarily in the coming decades. For this reason Moscow has an incentive to cement agreements that protect Russian interests while the country is experiencing a period of relative weakness. Sooner or later legitimizing the possession of Crimea via some form of compensation will be necessary. Though the deal will have been forced, it will also have been finalized.
Ukraine owes a significant amount of money to Russian companies, such as Gazprom, as well as international lenders (e.g. the IMF), and a variety of European banks and businesses. By compensating Ukraine for the annexation of Crimea Moscow would essentially be disbursing money which would ultimately flow back into the Russian economy while simultaneously protecting the interests of its European business partners. Essentially, the end result would be that Russia forced the sale of a territory of strategic importance to Moscow since it had become clear that Kiev could not be counted on the protect Russian interests. With the deal legitimized, Ukraine’s debt would be pared down to more manageable levels. That said, a Ukrainian default is still a very real concern. The IMF did not authorize a $17.1 billion bailout out of charity. The financial contagion that a Ukrainian default would engender would be extremely problematic to say the least and thus must be prevented. The IMF deal requires raising taxes and energy prices. Given that Kiev could not afford discounted gas it is unclear how Ukrainians will deal with this price hike. For this reason continued political instability in the country is likely. Despite this problem, any capital inflow (especially a compensation package that does not need to be repaid in the manner that a loan would) could put Ukraine on a path to ultimately regain a degree of economic self sufficiency and in theory become a stronger trade partner for both Russia and Europe. This process will not be easy and will need to be monitored closely.
Maintaining a favorable buffer against neighboring countries has long been a key concern of Russia. This is why ensuring the compliance of states such as Ukraine and Belarus has been a strategic imperative for Moscow. The leverage that comes with controlling the energy supply for many of its neighbors has been a useful foreign policy tool for Moscow in recent years. Not surprisingly Russia’s neighbors do not like this dependency. There are movements to undermine Russia’s leverage which naturally goes against Moscow’s interests and if Russia is distracted with Ukraine it has fewer resources to undermining these movements. There are numerous areas of concern for Moscow. For example, it is likely that US-Iranian détente will result in the development of energy pipelines linking the Caspian to the Persian Gulf and the further development of infrastructure connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey. We are already seeing some improvements in Azeri-Iranian relations that testify to this. September’s meeting of the Caspian 5 (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) will be an important summit to monitor. Another story to follow is the memorandum of intent that Ukraine and Slovakia signed on Monday April 28th. If the deal goes through the reverse flow of gas from Slovakia into Ukraine will commence in October. This will reduce Ukraine's dependency on Russian gas. Presumably, Moscow will try to undermine this deal.
While compensation for Crimea will not likely be paid out anytime soon such an action would help legitimize Russia’s claim to Crimea and could help ensure potential investors that the country is safe for business. Keep in mind it is in both Moscow’s and Western businesses’ interest to keep political instability in Russia at a minimum. Compensation is a means towards that end. For this reason, if Moscow starts making noise about offering some form of compensation for Crimea it could be a sign of improving business conditions in Russia.
Despite current geopolitical and economic obstacles Russia is relatively strong, however, the country is facing significant demographic challenges. Per the World Bank, 1988 was the last time the Total Fertility Rate was 2.1 (the replacement rate). From 1991 to 2011 this metric has fluctuated between 1.2 and 1.6 while the dependency ratio is 40 and growing. This means that Russia will likely be weakened both economically and militarily in the coming decades. For this reason Moscow has an incentive to cement agreements that protect Russian interests while the country is experiencing a period of relative weakness. Sooner or later legitimizing the possession of Crimea via some form of compensation will be necessary. Though the deal will have been forced, it will also have been finalized.
Ukraine owes a significant amount of money to Russian companies, such as Gazprom, as well as international lenders (e.g. the IMF), and a variety of European banks and businesses. By compensating Ukraine for the annexation of Crimea Moscow would essentially be disbursing money which would ultimately flow back into the Russian economy while simultaneously protecting the interests of its European business partners. Essentially, the end result would be that Russia forced the sale of a territory of strategic importance to Moscow since it had become clear that Kiev could not be counted on the protect Russian interests. With the deal legitimized, Ukraine’s debt would be pared down to more manageable levels. That said, a Ukrainian default is still a very real concern. The IMF did not authorize a $17.1 billion bailout out of charity. The financial contagion that a Ukrainian default would engender would be extremely problematic to say the least and thus must be prevented. The IMF deal requires raising taxes and energy prices. Given that Kiev could not afford discounted gas it is unclear how Ukrainians will deal with this price hike. For this reason continued political instability in the country is likely. Despite this problem, any capital inflow (especially a compensation package that does not need to be repaid in the manner that a loan would) could put Ukraine on a path to ultimately regain a degree of economic self sufficiency and in theory become a stronger trade partner for both Russia and Europe. This process will not be easy and will need to be monitored closely.
Maintaining a favorable buffer against neighboring countries has long been a key concern of Russia. This is why ensuring the compliance of states such as Ukraine and Belarus has been a strategic imperative for Moscow. The leverage that comes with controlling the energy supply for many of its neighbors has been a useful foreign policy tool for Moscow in recent years. Not surprisingly Russia’s neighbors do not like this dependency. There are movements to undermine Russia’s leverage which naturally goes against Moscow’s interests and if Russia is distracted with Ukraine it has fewer resources to undermining these movements. There are numerous areas of concern for Moscow. For example, it is likely that US-Iranian détente will result in the development of energy pipelines linking the Caspian to the Persian Gulf and the further development of infrastructure connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey. We are already seeing some improvements in Azeri-Iranian relations that testify to this. September’s meeting of the Caspian 5 (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) will be an important summit to monitor. Another story to follow is the memorandum of intent that Ukraine and Slovakia signed on Monday April 28th. If the deal goes through the reverse flow of gas from Slovakia into Ukraine will commence in October. This will reduce Ukraine's dependency on Russian gas. Presumably, Moscow will try to undermine this deal.
While compensation for Crimea will not likely be paid out anytime soon such an action would help legitimize Russia’s claim to Crimea and could help ensure potential investors that the country is safe for business. Keep in mind it is in both Moscow’s and Western businesses’ interest to keep political instability in Russia at a minimum. Compensation is a means towards that end. For this reason, if Moscow starts making noise about offering some form of compensation for Crimea it could be a sign of improving business conditions in Russia.
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