On November 7th China and Japan issued a carefully worded statement which indicates that Beijing and Tokyo are seeking to ease the tensions between the two countries which have risen dramatically since 2012 when Japan nationalized the islands in the Easy China Sea known as Senkaku to the Japanese and Diaoyu to the Chinese. The statement admitted that "Different Positions" exist in regard to who has sovereignty over the islands and announced plans to create a "Crisis Management Mechanism" to try and prevent the situation from worsening. A mechanism such as this could ideally set the stage for some form of formal agreement as to the legal status of the islands. A victory for China is that the original draft of the statement apparently stated that Japan had sovereignty over the islands but was aware of China’s claims. If Japan had refused to modify this wording it would have greatly complicated discussions and made it less likely that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe would meet during the APEC Summit in Beijing, that is currently under way, to discuss the matter further. Japan's apparent concession here indicates that Tokyo is serious about finding a resolution.
Both Japan and China have incentives to resolve this dispute. China has seen a significant drop in Japanese investment which is problematic during at time when the economic implications of potential shifts, such as reigning in China’s Shadow Banking Sector and reforming its Real Estate Market amongst other things, could severally compromise the growth rates that China has seen in recent decades and lead to an increase in social instability. (In theory China could refuse to make any meaningful reforms but that could lead to even worse consequences in the long-term). Japan meanwhile is facing its own degree of economic uncertainty as an increase in consumption taxes has limited economic growth, and the deflation of the Yen, while good for Japanese exporters, has negatively impacted the wealth of much of the Japanese populace. Both countries also have negative demographic trajectories which, barring a dramatic change to immigration policy, will lead to a context in which relatively fewer workers will be supporting a rapidly graying population. All of this comes at a time when China is working to transform its Navy into a Blue Water Navy, Japan is seeking to remilitarize, and the United State has made it clear that it will back Japan in the event of any military disputes.
It is pretty clear that both Beijing and Tokyo have a variety of pressing concerns. Resolving the disputes over the islands would afford both China and Japan more bandwidth to address these obstacles. A resolution could also afford Tokyo a degree of flexibility as Japan’s activities in the East China Sea are similar to those of China in the South China Sea. In January 2013 the Philippines filed a lawsuit against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration alleging violations of the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea. If the court findings favor The Philippines it could set a legal precedent that Beijing could use against Tokyo. Such a finding would not be an issue for the Japanese if the dispute over the islands were already resolved.
Despite the incentives to find a resolution the islands enflame nationalist sentiment in both countries. If either side is perceived as giving in too much there could be political consequences. It is also not impossible that any resolution in the East China Sea could be used as a template to resolve disputes in the South China Sea, thus, Beijing will not want to set any precedents that could be used against China. After all, Japan (backed by the US) and China are far more evenly matched than China and countries such as The Philippines and Vietnam. Beijing has no interest in setting precedents which weaker countries can use to the detriment of Chinese interests. In the next week we shall see how this potential compromise progresses. How far it goes and what each side is willing to give up will be telling not just for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands but also for disputes in the broader Western Pacific Region.
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Friday, November 7, 2014
Friday, June 20, 2014
The Implications of a Remilitarized Japan
On Thursday Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and New Komeito Party head Natsuo Yamaguchi confirmed that there will be no reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution to permit Collective Defense though the potential for such a shift is still possible. Such a move would be a preliminary step to the normalization of the Japanese military. Despite this delay it is probable that Japan will remilitarize at some point in the future given that Tokyo can not assume that the United States will always protect Japanese interests. Though there is a great deal of overlap between Washington and Tokyo's interests the reality is that the United States wants its allies to shoulder a greater burden in terms of providing security in their respective regions. Washington has also cut military spending due to the sequester. For these reasons Abe is hoping for the reinterpretation of the constitution by the end of the year to coincide with possible revisions to the guidelines governing US-Japanese defense cooperation. Such a shift will have geopolitical consequences in the Western Pacific
As things stand now Japan is working with the Philippines in order to protect Tokyo and Manila's mutual interests in the Western Pacific. Japan is helping the Philippines finance patrol boats as well as providing financial assistance to improve communication technology for the Filipino Coast Guard. Filipino President Aquino will be visiting Japan on the 24th of June. China’s activities in the South China Seas and how they should be addressed will likely be discussed during this trip. This is where collective defense comes in to play as neither country's military is a match for the Chinese however a united front with the participation of countries with similar grievances, such as Vietnam, and possibly with tacit or even explicit US support would be a strong deterrent. Though such a grouping could in theory cause China to behave in a less aggressive manner it is also likely that a united front could be viewed as a credible enough threat by Beijing that China will feel compelled to take preemptive action to protect its perceived interests. There are several reasons to act sooner rather than later including the reality that China faces significant demographic threats such as an aging population and an increasing dependency ratio. Beijing also needs to make significant economic reforms which will not be popular with the population. For these reasons anything that can boost nationalism in China is in Beijing's interest as it will serve as a distraction. The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is an issue which stokes a great deal of nationalist sentiment in China.
If Japan commits to remilitarization and makes overtures to Manila, Hanoi and other countries who are concerned with Beijing’s territorial ambitions it is possible that China will occupy the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands which both Japan and China claim. China's intent will not be to start a war (though there a credible arguments that Beijing will tolerate a short conflict). Beijing will be betting that despite the uproar that such a maneuver will cause the international community will feel that they have too much to lose economically if they push for strong sanctions against China. Certainly, Beijing is looking at the global response to Russia's annexation of Crimea with great interest. If China annexes the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands but manages to convince the international community that it will not interfere with shipping lanes in the region it is possible that many countries outside of the region will fell that any conflict is not worth the economic costs. The problem is that Japan and other regional powers, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, would likely view inaction as appeasement. The thinking in many East and Southeast Asian capitals might be, “If we allow this what next?”. Such a scenario sets the stage for a dramatic escalation in tensions which could impact some of the most important shipping lanes in the world. For this reason we must pay close attention to any signs that Japan will remilitarize as well as any developments that result in closer relations between Japan and countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam even if there is no overt call for Collective Defense. Given that Abe is pushing for a constitutional reinterpretation by the years end we might see significant developments in the South and East China Seas in the coming months.
As things stand now Japan is working with the Philippines in order to protect Tokyo and Manila's mutual interests in the Western Pacific. Japan is helping the Philippines finance patrol boats as well as providing financial assistance to improve communication technology for the Filipino Coast Guard. Filipino President Aquino will be visiting Japan on the 24th of June. China’s activities in the South China Seas and how they should be addressed will likely be discussed during this trip. This is where collective defense comes in to play as neither country's military is a match for the Chinese however a united front with the participation of countries with similar grievances, such as Vietnam, and possibly with tacit or even explicit US support would be a strong deterrent. Though such a grouping could in theory cause China to behave in a less aggressive manner it is also likely that a united front could be viewed as a credible enough threat by Beijing that China will feel compelled to take preemptive action to protect its perceived interests. There are several reasons to act sooner rather than later including the reality that China faces significant demographic threats such as an aging population and an increasing dependency ratio. Beijing also needs to make significant economic reforms which will not be popular with the population. For these reasons anything that can boost nationalism in China is in Beijing's interest as it will serve as a distraction. The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands is an issue which stokes a great deal of nationalist sentiment in China.
If Japan commits to remilitarization and makes overtures to Manila, Hanoi and other countries who are concerned with Beijing’s territorial ambitions it is possible that China will occupy the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands which both Japan and China claim. China's intent will not be to start a war (though there a credible arguments that Beijing will tolerate a short conflict). Beijing will be betting that despite the uproar that such a maneuver will cause the international community will feel that they have too much to lose economically if they push for strong sanctions against China. Certainly, Beijing is looking at the global response to Russia's annexation of Crimea with great interest. If China annexes the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands but manages to convince the international community that it will not interfere with shipping lanes in the region it is possible that many countries outside of the region will fell that any conflict is not worth the economic costs. The problem is that Japan and other regional powers, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, would likely view inaction as appeasement. The thinking in many East and Southeast Asian capitals might be, “If we allow this what next?”. Such a scenario sets the stage for a dramatic escalation in tensions which could impact some of the most important shipping lanes in the world. For this reason we must pay close attention to any signs that Japan will remilitarize as well as any developments that result in closer relations between Japan and countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam even if there is no overt call for Collective Defense. Given that Abe is pushing for a constitutional reinterpretation by the years end we might see significant developments in the South and East China Seas in the coming months.
Friday, June 13, 2014
The Implications of Developing Sino-Bangladeshi Relations in the Indian Ocean on International Relations in the South China Sea
This week Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina completed a three day visit to China. One of her primary objectives during the trip was to attract investment to develop a deep-sea port on Sonadia Island in the Bay of Bengal. Though an agreement is still pending such a development would serve as an additional stop along the so-called String of Pearls, a network of ports that the Chinese have helped develop which link East Africa, Southwest Asia, and South Asia to China. A further increase in China's presence in the Indian Ocean and the concomitant increase in trade that would presumably accompany it will be a positive step for Bangladesh even if it could complicate relations between Delhi and Dhaka. What garners less attention is the reality that an increase in China’s presence in the Indian Ocean could also exacerbate tensions in the South China Sea.
If there is a an increase in trade between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea the route will become more valuable. Though the energy resources in the South China Sea are attractive Beijing's primary interest in the region is to have greater control over shipping lanes through which half of the world’s cargo by tonnage passes through each year. China wants to be a great power and great powers are Blue Water Powers (i.e. they have a global naval presence). The problem with a global naval presence is that sovereign powers resent foreign powers imposing themselves near their territory. We have already seen heightened tensions in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines with the former allegedly ramming Chinese ships and the latter having filed a case against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague accusing Beijing of violating the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As long as China's neighbors are divided they cannot stand up to China in an effective manner. For this reason it will be important to note if the Philippines and Vietnam decide to cooperate to protect their interests in the South China Sea.
Though Manila and Hanoi have conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands there is evidence that the Vietnamese and Filipinos recognize that they can better protect their respective interests by cooperating. Last Sunday members of the Filipino and Vietnamese navies staged a symbolic display by gathering to play soccer and volleyball and drink beer on the Vietnamese held Southwest Cay in the South China Sea. Though such a gathering is hardly a concrete commitment to mutual defense it does send a message that cooperation is possible. It will be important to monitor if Filipino-Vietnamese relations develop beyond the symbolic and whether or not an agreement between the two countries will gain either direct or indirect support from Japan and the United States.
The so-called String of Pearls is a potential step to transform China into a Blue Water Power. This process will take decades and will be prone to conflicts. Whether or not these conflicts escalate to the point where diplomacy fails remains to be seen. What is important to note is that
what happens in the Indian Ocean can impact relations in the South and East China Seas. As countries in one region see China enhancing it power in another region they will question how this will impact their long-term interests. It is possible that we will see greater cooperation between the Philippines, Vietnam and a remilitarized Japan with either the explicit or implicit backing of the United States. Such a grouping might be able to provide a balance of power in the Western Pacific but it could also be viewed as a sufficient threat for Beijing to take action to protect Chinese interests. For this reason it is important to monitor factors which could unite countries in the South and East China Seas even if these factors are occurring in another region and their implications are not always immediately evident.
If there is a an increase in trade between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea the route will become more valuable. Though the energy resources in the South China Sea are attractive Beijing's primary interest in the region is to have greater control over shipping lanes through which half of the world’s cargo by tonnage passes through each year. China wants to be a great power and great powers are Blue Water Powers (i.e. they have a global naval presence). The problem with a global naval presence is that sovereign powers resent foreign powers imposing themselves near their territory. We have already seen heightened tensions in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines with the former allegedly ramming Chinese ships and the latter having filed a case against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague accusing Beijing of violating the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As long as China's neighbors are divided they cannot stand up to China in an effective manner. For this reason it will be important to note if the Philippines and Vietnam decide to cooperate to protect their interests in the South China Sea.
Though Manila and Hanoi have conflicting claims over the Spratly Islands there is evidence that the Vietnamese and Filipinos recognize that they can better protect their respective interests by cooperating. Last Sunday members of the Filipino and Vietnamese navies staged a symbolic display by gathering to play soccer and volleyball and drink beer on the Vietnamese held Southwest Cay in the South China Sea. Though such a gathering is hardly a concrete commitment to mutual defense it does send a message that cooperation is possible. It will be important to monitor if Filipino-Vietnamese relations develop beyond the symbolic and whether or not an agreement between the two countries will gain either direct or indirect support from Japan and the United States.
The so-called String of Pearls is a potential step to transform China into a Blue Water Power. This process will take decades and will be prone to conflicts. Whether or not these conflicts escalate to the point where diplomacy fails remains to be seen. What is important to note is that
what happens in the Indian Ocean can impact relations in the South and East China Seas. As countries in one region see China enhancing it power in another region they will question how this will impact their long-term interests. It is possible that we will see greater cooperation between the Philippines, Vietnam and a remilitarized Japan with either the explicit or implicit backing of the United States. Such a grouping might be able to provide a balance of power in the Western Pacific but it could also be viewed as a sufficient threat for Beijing to take action to protect Chinese interests. For this reason it is important to monitor factors which could unite countries in the South and East China Seas even if these factors are occurring in another region and their implications are not always immediately evident.
Friday, January 10, 2014
Is Foreign Investment Helping to Undermine the Stability of Mozambique?
This week Japanese President Shinzo Abe will visit Mozambique to discuss a variety of issues related to energy and agriculture. The trip, the first African visit from a Japanese premier in eight years, highlights the growing importance of Africa to Tokyo as Japan competes with China for influence on the continent. Abe is expected to announce $577 in loans for road construction which will help further develop the Mozambican mining industry. Mozambique has developed rapidly since the 1992 Peace Treaty which ended years of civil war. The country now has the potential to be an important exporter of agricultural goods and LNG. Mozambique’s location on the Indian Ocean also situates it in an area where it can easily service Asian markets whose demands for food and energy are ever increasing. Ensuring access to these resources is one of the primary purposes of Abe’s visit. What Japan, and the world, needs to understand is that Mozambique is facing increased internal instability and some of the agricultural deals that Abe will likely be discussing have the potential to further exacerbate tensions.
Mozambique attained independence in 1974 and almost immediately fell into a state of civil war which pitted the Marxist Frelimo against the anti-Communist Renamo. A peace deal was brokered in 1992. Since this time a great deal of development has occurred in the country, however, in October 2013 Renamo renounced the 1992 Peace Treaty. This action clearly endangers political stability. On Wednesday January 9th Renamo killed six members of the Mozambican Riot Police. In addition to this they have also reestablished a base in Nhamunde in the Southeast of the country. Renamo’s activity in Northern Mozambique has also disrupted mining operations for companies such as Rio Tinto. It is unlikely that they will cease their activities anytime soon. In fact if October’s general election is unfavorable to Renamo further instability could result. If they can generate support from the local population the situation could deteriorate further.
In theory Renamo could exploit discontent against agricultural deals which have deprived local populations of their land. This action is of course subject to how they treat the local people. Renamo has a history of recruiting child soldiers and committing atrocities against local populations. Neither action is the sort of policy that wins the hearts and minds of a population nor do people forget groups that have subjected them to such abuse. Due to past precedent it would be dangerous to assume that Renamo would be able to gain local support, however, projecting what might happen if they pursued such a plan (and were relatively successful) is a worthwhile undertaking. After all, there is a great deal of discontent against deals that benefit foreigners and Maputo at the expense of the locals. One such program is ProSavana. This program will likely be discussed during Abe’s visit as the Japanese have invested a great deal in it.
ProSavana is a joint undertaking between the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG) and Local Government, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Per ProSavana’s website the organization seeks to:
Vision
Improve the livelihood of inhabitants of Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.
Missions
1. Improve and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production, and diversify agricultural production.
2. Create employment through agricultural investment and establishment of a supply chain.
Objective
Create new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-orientated agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.
Essentially, ProSavana is trying to replicate the success that Brazil had in increasing agricultural output in its Cerrado region. The Cerrado is similar to Northern Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor in terms of agricultural potential. On the surface this intent sounds positive, however, the program has led to the displacement of local farmers. There is also evidence that people who have official land usage certificates are being displaced by agribusiness. There is little evidence that their complaints have led to any real resolution. A key factor that differentiates the Nacala Corridor from Brazil’s Cerrado region is that the population density is significantly higher in the Nacala Corridor thus more people are impacted by development. This means that there could be a larger pool of individuals who feel that they have no other course of action than insurgency.
In theory foreign investment could be positive for the populations of places such as the Nacala Corridor. For example, if a company comes in and dramatically increases agricultural yield while providing jobs and training the firm could contribute to local food security and provide economic opportunity while turning a profit and exporting the extra food to countries with less agricultural output. This is a win-win situation and there certainly are cases where this model is being effectively employed. The problem is that there are other situations where displacement and the concomitant removal of livelihoods are the norm. Cases like these generate distrust and make it more difficult to negotiate positive land deals. On one hand governments are in part to blame. For example, there have been cases where companies have negotiated a deal for unoccupied land only to find villages complete with postal service (a pretty clear indication that the government knew that the settlement existed). One the other hand businesses have a responsibility to understand the local conditions in place in which they intend to invest. After all, the failure to understand local conditions can harm businesses.
Anyone investing in agriculture needs to recognize that if land is arable it is safe to assume that someone is occupying it. If no settlements exist there probably is a very good reason for this. This reason needs to be determined in order to ensure that it can not come back to harm the company. Such damages can take numerous forms. For example, sabotage can be an issue. The negative PR that depriving a people of their livelihoods is also never welcome. Security concerns can also impact production. In some cases a situation occurs in which a political group can turn the discontent of the broader population to their advantage at the expense of the private sector. This is the exact circumstance that Renamo could theoretically exploit. The potential for any of these problems is something that companies need to gauge. After all, the negative PR that results from taking peoples’ land combined with lost profits due to suspended operations is not good for business?
Mozambique attained independence in 1974 and almost immediately fell into a state of civil war which pitted the Marxist Frelimo against the anti-Communist Renamo. A peace deal was brokered in 1992. Since this time a great deal of development has occurred in the country, however, in October 2013 Renamo renounced the 1992 Peace Treaty. This action clearly endangers political stability. On Wednesday January 9th Renamo killed six members of the Mozambican Riot Police. In addition to this they have also reestablished a base in Nhamunde in the Southeast of the country. Renamo’s activity in Northern Mozambique has also disrupted mining operations for companies such as Rio Tinto. It is unlikely that they will cease their activities anytime soon. In fact if October’s general election is unfavorable to Renamo further instability could result. If they can generate support from the local population the situation could deteriorate further.
In theory Renamo could exploit discontent against agricultural deals which have deprived local populations of their land. This action is of course subject to how they treat the local people. Renamo has a history of recruiting child soldiers and committing atrocities against local populations. Neither action is the sort of policy that wins the hearts and minds of a population nor do people forget groups that have subjected them to such abuse. Due to past precedent it would be dangerous to assume that Renamo would be able to gain local support, however, projecting what might happen if they pursued such a plan (and were relatively successful) is a worthwhile undertaking. After all, there is a great deal of discontent against deals that benefit foreigners and Maputo at the expense of the locals. One such program is ProSavana. This program will likely be discussed during Abe’s visit as the Japanese have invested a great deal in it.
ProSavana is a joint undertaking between the Ministry of Agriculture of Mozambique (MINAG) and Local Government, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC). Per ProSavana’s website the organization seeks to:
Improve the livelihood of inhabitants of Nacala Corridor through inclusive and sustainable agricultural and regional development.
Missions
1. Improve and modernise agriculture to increase productivity and production, and diversify agricultural production.
2. Create employment through agricultural investment and establishment of a supply chain.
Objective
Create new agricultural development models, taking into account the natural environment and socio-economic aspects, and seeking market-orientated agricultural/rural/regional development with a competitive edge.
Essentially, ProSavana is trying to replicate the success that Brazil had in increasing agricultural output in its Cerrado region. The Cerrado is similar to Northern Mozambique’s Nacala Corridor in terms of agricultural potential. On the surface this intent sounds positive, however, the program has led to the displacement of local farmers. There is also evidence that people who have official land usage certificates are being displaced by agribusiness. There is little evidence that their complaints have led to any real resolution. A key factor that differentiates the Nacala Corridor from Brazil’s Cerrado region is that the population density is significantly higher in the Nacala Corridor thus more people are impacted by development. This means that there could be a larger pool of individuals who feel that they have no other course of action than insurgency.
In theory foreign investment could be positive for the populations of places such as the Nacala Corridor. For example, if a company comes in and dramatically increases agricultural yield while providing jobs and training the firm could contribute to local food security and provide economic opportunity while turning a profit and exporting the extra food to countries with less agricultural output. This is a win-win situation and there certainly are cases where this model is being effectively employed. The problem is that there are other situations where displacement and the concomitant removal of livelihoods are the norm. Cases like these generate distrust and make it more difficult to negotiate positive land deals. On one hand governments are in part to blame. For example, there have been cases where companies have negotiated a deal for unoccupied land only to find villages complete with postal service (a pretty clear indication that the government knew that the settlement existed). One the other hand businesses have a responsibility to understand the local conditions in place in which they intend to invest. After all, the failure to understand local conditions can harm businesses.
Anyone investing in agriculture needs to recognize that if land is arable it is safe to assume that someone is occupying it. If no settlements exist there probably is a very good reason for this. This reason needs to be determined in order to ensure that it can not come back to harm the company. Such damages can take numerous forms. For example, sabotage can be an issue. The negative PR that depriving a people of their livelihoods is also never welcome. Security concerns can also impact production. In some cases a situation occurs in which a political group can turn the discontent of the broader population to their advantage at the expense of the private sector. This is the exact circumstance that Renamo could theoretically exploit. The potential for any of these problems is something that companies need to gauge. After all, the negative PR that results from taking peoples’ land combined with lost profits due to suspended operations is not good for business?
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