The Shift of the Balance of Power in Northeastern Africa and Its Impact on Hydropolitical Cooperation in the Blue Nile States

On Monday November 4^th, 2013 representatives from The Republic of Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia met in Khartoum to discuss the findings of a report by an International Panel of Experts concerning the development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Though an agreement to form a supervisory committee for the dam failed it is important to note that this meeting would have been inconceivable three years ago, however, the Arab Spring and the secession of South Sudan have significantly changed the balance of power in Northeastern Africa. Cairo's consent to the meeting and Khartoum's support of the dam testifies to this shift. Though an agreement has not been reached, Egypt’s weakness and Sudan’s support of the dam indicates that a deal could become a reality provided that Cairo’s concerns are mollified. A more thorough examination of the dam's impact could go a long way to addressing these concerns paving the way for an agreement which would increase energy production and agricultural output while reducing political instability between the countries (Egypt’s domestic situation is an entirely different story).

Due to domestic instability Egypt has neither the strength to enforce its will on the Nile nor the resources to go to war, especially as most of its co-riparian countries have common hydropolitical grievances which could unite them. The Republic of Sudan is the only other country whose water rights Cairo formally recognizes. This has historically meant that Egypt and Sudan's interests usually aligned, however, in a recent about-face Khartoum is now in support of the dam. This change in policy is not surprising as the independence of South Sudan has reduced oil revenues for the Republic of Sudan making the revitalization of its agricultural sector an economic imperative. The dam will facilitate this shift. An increase in arable land is essential as Khartoum and Beijing have recently reached an Agricultural Cooperation Agreement.

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is scheduled to be completed by 2017. When operational it will facilitate the irrigation of about 500,000ha of new agricultural lands in Sudan. The dam will be based on the Benishangul-Gumuz region of North Eastern Ethiopia, which is about 25 miles from the Sudanese border. This proximity will provide cheap energy to Sudan further helping the country develop. The fact that Ethiopia is paying the dam's projected cost of 4.7 billion USD is also a benefit for Sudan. Naturally, the dam will help Ethiopia meet its own developmental needs. Certainly, the country will benefit from the hydropower and increased agricultural yield. Recent deals with Djibouti, such as the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway line, are also reducing the land locked status that the independence of Eritrea has imposed on Ethiopia. This will help reduce the cost of Ethiopian exports.

Cairo now finds itself in a position where negotiating is preferable to aggression. Khartoum has an affordable way to reorient its economy. And Addis Ababa is in a position to attract investment and build up its economy. All of these changes reflect the regional power shift. Ideally, an increase in agricultural yields will allow the region to feed its growing population while exporting the surplus. That said, the terms and conditions of such deals should be monitored closely as the ideal and the actual do not always overlap. Overly exploitative deals could reduce the stability that an agreement on the dam could bring.