The Potential Impact on Sino-Korean Relations of a Delay of the Transfer of OPCOM

The Implications of Korean Reunification Part 2:

This is the second part of an analysis of the changes that we could expect to see in the event of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Please note that I am not arguing that reunification will occur. I am merely outling the likely outcomes of reunification and their implication on regional security and the global economy. 

The Potential Impact on Sino-Korean Relations of a Delay of the Transfer of OPCOM:

A recent RAND report has argued that there are signs that North Korea could be close to collapse. The report cites numerous concerns such as evidence that there is a greater recognition amongst the North Korea population that the citizens of the Republic of Korea (ROK) do not have a lower standard of living. This recognition has the potential to lead to social instability at a time when North Korea’s Chinese benefactor is showing signs that it is losing patience with Pyongyang’s rhetoric. All of this is occurring while the South Koreans are adjusting their military strategy to contend with any nuclear weapons that the North can develop, and seeking to delay the transfer of military power from Washington to Seoul. Though we cannot say for certain whether or not North Korea will implode, we must be prepared for such an event.

Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric has raised concerns amongst certain segments of the Chinese population that Pyongyang might cross a line that forces South Korea and the United States to become involved in North Korea. Such an action would likely force a confrontation between the US and China that neither party wants. Within the past week South Korean President Park Geun-hye has stressed that South Korea will build strong defenses to destroy any nuclear weapons that North Korea develops. On October 1^st President Park stated, "Only when we are backed by strong national defense that does not allow provocations can we bring North Korea onto a genuine path of change." This statement was issued the same week that the US and the ROK endorsed a deterrence strategy that includes the use of the United State’s conventional strike and missile defense capabilities. A Kill Chain System (a system to detect signs of incoming missile or nuclear attacks and launch pre-emptive strikes in the event of such attacks) is also part of the plan. These actions indicate that Seoul is concerned that Pyongyang might be changing the tactic of escalating regional tensions in order to draw China, the US, Japan, the ROK and Russia to the bargaining table where Pyongyang has historically extracted concessions in exchange for backing down. Such a tactical shift would have a profound impact on the stability of the region.

The ROK also wishes to delay the transfer of OPCON (Operational Control). In other words the Koreans have said that they want to delay taking control over military operations in their country. Currently, the U.S. Forces Korea commander is in charge of both American and Korean troops. A Korean four-star general would serve as deputy commander in the event of hostilities. As things stand now the transfer of OPCON is set for December 2015, however, it has been delayed in the past due to North Korean belligerence. Another delay is not impossible. Due to low birth rates in South Korea it is also probable that the number of Korean Military personnel will be smaller in the future which means that Seoul might need additional military support in the future. A delay in transferring OPCON combined with a smaller South Korean military and the continuation of US interests in East Asia means that the United States could be in charge indefinitely if South Korea were attacked.

Encouraging the reunification of the Korean Peninsula could potentially afford China and the United States (along with the Koreans and other regional powers) the opportunity to preemptively address regional security concerns thus reducing the risk of hostilities that no one wants. The Chinese could also position themselves to benefit economically from such a deal as well as convincing the United States to withdraw much of its military operations from the Korean Peninsula (please note that a total US withdrawal from the Asia Pacific Region is HIGHLY unlikely). Though reunification would result in China losing a buffer state that has historically been of strategic importance such an action could see Beijing gaining some economic advantage and international prestige while having some of China’s more pressing security concern addressed. In the next posts of this series I will explain how, and under what circumstances, such events could unfold.